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IMPLICATIONS OF THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: EXAMPLES
FROM THE CONTROL OF HAZARDOUS
AIR POLLUTANTS IN THE 1990 CLEAN
AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
BERNARD D. GOLDSTEIN* AND RUSSELLYN S. CARRUTH**
I
INTRODUCTION
In this Article we take a cautionary approach to the Precautionary Principle.
We argue that the hazardous air pollutant provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments provide an example of the Precautionary Principle incorporated
into U.S. environmental legislation.  Evaluating the outcome thus far leads us to
the conclusion that utilizing the Precautionary Principle as a basis for legislation
can be problematic to public-health goals.  Our reasons for this conclusion
include the potential inhibition of the development of more effective air pollu-
tion control technology once the regulations have been written, the inhibitory
effect on further research and the demonstration of health benefit, and the loss
of focus on those hazardous air pollutant compounds and sources that provide
the greatest likelihood for toxicity and misplaced focus on individual rather
than population exposure—a loss of focus that undermines the public-health
basis of the Clean Air Act.  A clear understanding of its potential negative
aspects is needed to maximize the many potential benefits of the Precautionary
Principle to public-health and environmental laws and regulations.
Many advocates of more expansive environmental and public-health control
measures urge prolific use of the Precautionary Principle as a rationale for
regulatory intervention.  One of the earliest and substantial formulations of the
Precautionary Principle was adopted in the 1992 Rio Declaration: “Nations
shall use the precautionary approach to protect the environment.  Where there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, scientific uncertainty shall not be
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used to postpone cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degrada-
tion.”1
Yet, the Precautionary Principle is a broad statement of principle, subject to
varying interpretations.  More recent formulations, such as the Wingspread
Statement,2 have moved away from Rio’s emphasis both on cost effectiveness
and how serious a threat must be to invoke the Precautionary Principle, and
have extended the Precautionary Principle to address protection of public
health as well as the environment.
Such broad statements can be very valuable, even if vaguely defined.  Pre-
caution is a universal value similar to “sustainable development,” which serves
as a rather amorphous rallying cry for many divergent interests that support
economic development in a manner that does not harm the environment.3  It is
hard to imagine that anyone is against sustainable development.  The Precau-
tionary Principle also is supportable as a primary preventive approach that is as
old as the Hippocratic Oath’s adjuration: “Above all do no harm.”
Thus, the Precautionary Principle is increasingly advocated and grounded in
legally enforceable contexts such as international treaties.  For instance, as
urged by the European Community in the hormone-treated beef case, the
World Trade Organization was forced to consider whether the Precautionary
Principle is an established principle of law applicable to adjudication of interna-
tional trade disputes,4 and the WTO will undoubtedly face the issue again in fu-
ture disputes over genetically modified organisms and biodiversity.  In such
contexts, the exact definition of the Precautionary Principle and the legal impli-
cations of its use are of critical importance.
A major motivation for advocacy and action under the Precautionary Prin-
ciple is a sense of frustration with the slow pace of science and risk-based regu-
lation.  This is understandable.  An all-too-familiar ploy of industry is to
obstruct or delay risk-based regulation by requesting more scientific study5 or
1. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
2. The Wingspread Statement is as follows: “When an activity raises threat of harm to human
health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect rela-
tionships are not fully established scientifically.”  PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 8 (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel
Tickner eds., 1999).
3. An example of the ability of both industry and environmental groups to support sustainable
development was Clinton’s Presidential Council on Sustainable Development, which was co-chaired by
Jonathon Lash, head of the World Resources Institute, a leading environmental group, and David
Buzzelli, a vice-president of Dow Chemical.  See Forum; Sustainable Development Council, 101 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. (Oct. 1993), available at http://ehpnet1.niehs.nih.gov/docs/1993/101-5/forum.html.
Also, industry has developed the World Business Council on Sustainable Development, which has 160
multinational members and is headquartered in Geneva.  See The World Business Council for Sustain-
able Development, at www.wbcsd.ch (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
4. See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Jan. 16, 1998, WT/DS26/
AB/R (1998), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/26-12.wpf.
5. For a recent critique of industry delaying tactics that links its thesis specifically to the Precau-
tionary Principle, see SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, TRUST US WE’RE EXPERTS: HOW
INDUSTRY MANIPULATES SCIENCE AND GAMBLES WITH YOUR FUTURE 120-51 (2002).
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challenging its scientific validity in the courts.6  Even when ultimately unsuccess-
ful, such challenges often delay regulation by years.  Inevitably, in any situation
in which a chemical has been regulated after the slow accretion of proof of
harm, there is a time period during which advocates of control have been forced
to wait until new information developed or was accepted.7  When the scientific
information does become sufficiently preponderant to warrant regulatory
action, it is then obvious that it would have been beneficial to public health or
the environment to heed the voice of advocates much earlier.  The European
Community, in its current push for general acceptance of the Precautionary
Principle, has recently published a scholarly review of situations in which earlier
regulatory action based upon as yet inconclusive science would have been bene-
ficial.8
However, to some advocates of the Precautionary Principle this is not sim-
ply an issue of when there is sufficient information to make a decision.  Rather,
the Precautionary Principle involves concepts of deconstructionism and post-
modern science and democracy, the need to replace a non-democratic technoc-
racy with a more humanistic and community-oriented approach to decision-
making.9  To these supporters of the Precautionary Principle, risk assessment
and its practitioners are a threat to the future of our planet and the Precaution-
ary Principle is seen as an effective means to firmly shift the burden of proof
onto the would-be polluter.10
The Precautionary Principle can be considered generally under two head-
ings:11
1. Precautionary actions that supplant standard risk-based approaches
through actions based upon the threat of a problem without sufficient
information to assign risk, or through shifting the burden of proof to the
6. For examples of industry challenging the scientific validity of regulation in the courts, see,
David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, Industry Challenges to the Principle of Prevention in Public Health:
the Precautionary Principle in Historical Perspective, 117 PUB. HEALTH REP. 501-12 (2002), and
EUROPEAN ENVTL. AGENCY, LATE LESSONS FROM EARLY WARNINGS: THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE 1896–2000 (2001), available at http://reports.eea.eu.int/environmental_issue_report_2001_
22/en/Issue_Report_No_22.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2003).
7. See, e.g., EUROPEAN ENVTL. AGENCY, supra note 6.
8. Id.  Notably, the document does not explore situations in which early warnings about a benefi-
cial chemical turned out to have been mistaken.
9. See, e.g., MARY O’BRIEN, MAKING BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS (2000).  For a more
generalized discussion of postmodern thought and environmentalism, see Paul Wapner, Leftist Criti-
cism of “Nature:” Environmental Protection in a Postmodern Age, DISSENT MAG., Winter 2003, at 71-
75, available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/articles/wi03/wapner.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
2003).
10. Cf. O’BRIEN, supra note 9, at 15, 39 (“Risk assessment is an extremely flexible and powerful
tool for dispelling calls for change” and “is primarily used to defend unnecessary activities that harm
the environment or human health.”).
11. We recognize that for the purposes of this Article we are creating a simplified operational
dichotomy of the many possible approaches that fall at least arguably under the heading of the Precau-
tionary Principle.  John Applegate has introduced a useful term—Precautionary Preference—in his dis-
cussion of how American environmental law reflects the Precautionary Principle.  See John S.
Applegate, The Precautionary Preference: An American Perspective on the Precautionary Principle, 6
HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 413, 413-43 (2000).
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presumption of harm.  We will call these “pre-emptive precautionary
approaches.”
2. Precautionary actions that take more prudent approaches to risk assess-
ment and increase risk management activity, for example, by establish-
ing more conservative default assumptions to risk assessment, or
through choosing a more stringent risk level on which to base regulatory
controls, or by adding additional safety factors.  We will call these “risk-
based precautionary approaches.”12
While many risk professionals view the Precautionary Principle not as some-
thing new, but merely as another call to build further prudent assumptions and
safety factors into risk assessment and risk management,13 the regulation of haz-
ardous air pollutants (“HAPs”) in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments14
(“CAAA”) embodies pre-emptive precautionary actions that supercede risk
assessment and establish a new principle for regulatory intervention.
We have evaluated the 1990 CAAA concerning HAPs as it is our belief that
in such legislation Congress radically altered the United States’ approach to
regulating HAPs by a classic imposition of the Precautionary Principle.15 The
CAAA are, therefore, an appropriate means to evaluate the implications of the
use of the Precautionary Principle in environmental regulation in the United
States.
II
REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS: BACKGROUND16
Before the 1990 CAAA, HAPs had been regulated through a science-based
process that called for EPA to identify unregulated air pollutants that were
likely to cause serious adverse health effects at ambient air concentrations.17  To
12. Risk-based approaches include the many safety factors and prudent default assumptions built
into contemporary risk assessment.  An example is the additional factor of ten for the protection of
children in the Food Quality Protection Act.  See Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).  Other
examples are the many conservative default assumptions built into risk assessment, such as assuming an
individual stays stationary in a high-risk location around the clock for seventy years, or that any single
molecule of a carcinogen can cause cancer.
13. The use of a “maximally exposed individual” as the target for the residual risk determination in
the Clean Air Act Amendments’ hazardous air pollutant provisions might be considered an example of
a risk-based precautionary approach.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2000).
14. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
15. We have found no indication that HAPs were discussed by Congress explicitly in terms of the
Precautionary Principle.  Nor did we find the term “Precautionary Principle” in the published legisla-
tive history.  Nonetheless, we believe, as discussed infra, that the amended HAPs Program clearly
embodies the Precautionary Principle.
16. For an overview of HAP control, see, for example, Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Randy Lowell,
Control of Hazardous Air Pollution, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 229 (2001).
17. 42 U.S.C § 7412(b)(1)(A) (1988) (amended 1990).  A “hazardous air pollutant” was defined as
an air pollutant to which no ambient air quality standard is applicable and that, in the judgment of the
EPA administrator, causes or contributes to air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to result
in an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness. §
7412(a)(1) (amended 1990).
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a large extent, this was aimed at regulating known human carcinogens. 18  During
this period, risk-based regulation of HAPs was an arduous and time-consuming
process, subject to lengthy hearing procedures and court challenges.19  In the
eighteen years before the 1990 amendments, EPA listed only eight substances
as HAPs and promulgated emission limitations for only seven substances.20
The regulation of benzene as a HAP provides a marked demonstration of
the cumbersome nature of the regulatory process.  In 1977, after decades of sci-
entific debate, it was clearly established that benzene is a human carcinogen.21
Accordingly, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”)
went through a number of procedural approaches to set a new workplace stan-
dard that, after challenge by industry, was struck down by the Supreme Court in
18. These compounds, such as benzene, could not readily be regulated under the “national ambient
air quality standards” (“NAAQS”) provisions of the Clean Air Act for two major reasons.  First, in
contrast to the NAAQS pollutants, such as ozone and particulates, there was no direct evidence of
adverse effects on humans at ambient concentrations in the general environment.  When standards for
the NAAQS pollutants, the so-called “primary air quality pollutants,” were set, these pollutants were
known to cause adverse effects in humans at actual outdoor levels based upon epidemiological studies
or observations of humans experimentally exposed to these pollutant levels.  In contrast, as an example,
benzene had only been shown to cause leukemia in humans at concentrations encountered in the
workplace that were approximately a thousand-fold higher than the worst anticipated outdoor levels,
and there were no epidemiological studies demonstrating that ambient levels of benzene were capable
of increasing leukemia risk.  See, e.g., Bernard D. Goldstein & Gisela Witz, Benzene, in
ENVIRONMENTAL TOXICANTS: HUMAN EXPOSURES AND THEIR HEALTH EFFECTS 121-50  (Morton
Lippman ed., 2d ed. 1999).  Instead, benzene and other such HAP compounds, particularly the carcino-
gens, were assumed to be harmful based upon risk analysis, including extrapolation from animals to
humans, or from high dose in the workplace to much lower doses in the general environment.  Second,
setting an ambient standard in the NAAQS process required the EPA administrator to determine the
level of a compound that, with an adequate margin of safety, would not produce an adverse effect in a
sensitive population.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000).  On the requirement to protect sensitive
populations, see, for example, American Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  This
requirement implies that there is some harmless level of a compound.  In contrast, standard prudent
risk assessment for carcinogens uses a model that in essence assumes that every molecule poses a risk,
however small, so that there is no level that is without any risk.  It has been impossible for Congress, or
for any administration, to suggest that there is an acceptable level of an environmental carcinogen.  See
Bernard D. Goldstein, Toxic Substances in The Atmospheric Environment: A Critical Review, 33 J. AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N 454, 454-67 (1983); Bernard D. Goldstein, Critical Review of Toxic Air
Pollutants—Revisited, 36 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N 367, 367-70 (1986).
19. Congressional frustration with EPA’s lack of progress is reflected by the courts.  See, e.g., Natu-
ral Res. Def. Council v. Thomas, 689 F. Supp. 246, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (commenting on the plaintiff’s
assertion of unreasonable delay by EPA):
It is a question of substance because of the leaden pace of EPA’s progress in this area.
Indeed, . . . in 1983 a congressional oversight subcommittee took then-EPA Administrator
Ruckelshaus to task for delays in implementing Section 112.  The subcommittee received from
Mr. Ruckelshaus assurances which the Agency has not redeemed.  In reviewing the chronol-
ogy, replete with endless reviews, open-ended studies, proclaimed needs for further analysis,
consultations and testings, but with minimal results, one is reminded of Gilbert’s lyric in
Iolanthe, Act 2:
‘The House of Peers,
throughout the war,
Did nothing in particular,
And did it very well.’
Id. at 260.
20. Nat’l Mine Ass’n v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351, 1353 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
21. Bernard D. Goldstein, Benzene Hematotoxicity in Humans. 2 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL.
HEALTH 69, 69-105 (Supp. 1977).
010904 GOLDSTEIN.DOC 02/11/04  4:18 PM
252 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:247
the 1980 decision Industry Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute, which emphasized the importance of risk assessment as a regulatory
tool.22  Meanwhile, EPA was moving through its own HAPs regulatory process
with respect to benzene.  Following the initial OSHA emergency action in 1977,
EPA Administrator Douglas Costle began the first step of the Section 112 pro-
cess by listing benzene as a hazardous air pollutant.  An EPA press release of
May 31, 1977 quotes Costle as saying: “EPA will begin a thorough review of
current scientific data to determine the health risks from benzene in the ambi-
ent (outside) air.  After this health risks assessment is completed, EPA will
decide which sources of benzene emissions must be controlled, and the extent
of control needed.” 23
Yet, six years later EPA had not yet regulated benzene.  Congressional frus-
tration with the slow pace of this process was evident in hearings for the new
EPA administrator, William D. Ruckelshaus, during which Congress extracted
a promise from Ruckelshaus of rapid agency action on benzene and other
HAPs.24  Pursuant to that promise, EPA in 1984 moved forward with emission
standards for benzene.25  The benzene regulation contained a table listing all of
the major industrial sources of benzene, the tonnage of benzene released, the
leukemia risk to the maximally exposed individual, the leukemia risk to the
total population, the extent to which these risks would be reduced by the pro-
posed control technology, the capital costs of these controls, and the yearly
maintenance costs of the controls.26  Based upon this information, EPA regu-
lated some but not all of the sources of benzene.27  Administrator Ruckelshaus
carefully pointed out that the decision as to which benzene source to regulate
and which not to regulate was based upon all of the information, rather than on
any single risk or cost factor.28  While this left the EPA administrator with
maximum flexibility for future regulatory decisions on HAPs, it also left indus-
try and public groups with further frustration concerning the selective and
unpredictable nature of the process.
22. 448 U.S. 607, 659 (1980).
23. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, EPA to Regulate Benzene, a Suspected Cause of
Leukemia (May 31, 1977), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/benzene/01.htm (last visited
Apr. 11, 2003).
24. Goldstein, Benzene Hematotoxicity, supra note 21.
25. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions from Maleic
Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, and Benzene Storage Vessels; Proposed Withdrawal
of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 8386 (proposed Mar. 6, 1984).  These regulations actually were a
revision of a proposal made by the outgoing Carter Administration on which no action had been taken.
See 46 Fed. Reg. 1165 (proposed Jan. 5, 1981).  The resultant regulatory maneuvering led to Federal
Register documents through which EPA withdrew some of the earlier proposed actions and promul-
gated others.  See National Environmental Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants—Benzene Equip-
ment Leaks (Fugitive Emission Sources), 49 Fed. Reg. 23,498 (June 6, 1984); Proposed National Envi-
ronmental Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants—Benzene Emissions, Coke By-Product Recovery
Plants, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,522 (June 6, 1984).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. This was specifically stated by Ruckelshaus to his staff at this time and also can be inferred
from the lack of specificity in the federal regulations. Id.
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Congressional and public impatience about the protracted pace of regulat-
ing the many chemicals emitted by industrial sources was further fueled by the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.29  As a result of that
Act, a Toxic Release Inventory provided readily accessible information that
accounted for the pounds of specific HAP compounds released into a given
community.30  In part recognizing that TRI-fed public outrage would lead to a
demand for control measures regardless of the degree of actual harm, industry
offered relatively little opposition to the forthcoming legislation, and as a
result,31 in the 1990 CAAA, Congress embraced the Precautionary Principle by
creating a HAPs program that imposed control measures regardless of the
degree of risk.
III
HAPS PROGRAM UNDER THE 1990 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
The central elements of the amended HAPs program mandate precaution-
ary action that is not based on, and in fact supplants, risk analysis and thus con-
stitutes what we have called pre-emptive precautionary action.  The amend-
ments were a radical departure from the original HAPs program.
One major departure was Congress’s enumeration of 189 chemicals it
decreed as EPA-regulated HAPs.32  Prior to the amendment, a substance could
be regulated as a HAP only after EPA made a science-based determination
following a rigorous risk analysis that determined the substance posed a sub-
stantial risk to human health at ambient air levels.33  Thus, the amendment sub-
stituted legislative fiat for risk assessment in determining what substances are
HAPs.  The main role for science was left to be an exculpatory one:  if an indus-
try wants to remove a substance from the HAPs list, it must affirmatively dem-
onstrate, by adequate scientific data, that the substance may not reasonably be
anticipated to cause adverse effects to human health or the environment.34
“EPA will not remove a substance from the list of HAP based merely on the
inability to conclude that emissions of the substance will cause adverse effects
29. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 300-330, 100 Stat. 1613, 1728-58 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001-50).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2000); see also The Toxics Release Inventory Explorer, at
http:www.epa.gov/triexplorer/chemical.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
31. The potential counter-argument—that the major public concern about HAPs was cancer, and
that the HAP chemicals responsible for the overwhelming majority of cancer risk caused by air pollu-
tion were already regulated—was considered unlikely to be publicly or politically acceptable.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b), (d) (2000).
33. See Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1685 (1970) (amending § 4(a) of the Clean Air Act).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(3).
The Administrator shall delete a substance from the list upon a showing by the petitioner or
on the Administrator’s own determination that there is adequate data on the health and envi-
ronmental effects of the substance to determine that emissions, ambient concentrations, bio-
accumulation or deposition of the substance may not reasonably be anticipated to cause any
adverse effects to the human health or adverse environmental effects.
§ 7412(b)(3)(C).
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on human health or the environment.”35  This shift in the burden of proof is cen-
tral to many of the explications of the Precautionary Principle.36  It assumes that
the harmfulness of chemicals, or at least synthetic chemicals, is implicit and that
the only appropriate way to protect human health and the environment is to
avoid their use unless rigorously shown to be safe.37
Another departure from the previous HAPs program in keeping with the
Precautionary Principle is that the amendment mandates that EPA regulate all
industrial sources of all HAPs based on a “maximum available control technol-
ogy” (“MACT”) standard38 that essentially requires that the most stringent
technologically-achievable emission standards are applied to all industrial
sources emitting any listed HAP, regardless of the degree of risk to human
health.  All listed HAP sources are regulated using the same MACT standard. 39
Whether a source sits in the middle of a desert or the edge of the ocean with no
one downwind for many miles, or in the midst of a densely populated city,
makes no difference in setting emission limits.  Nor is there any consideration of
35. 66 Fed. Reg. 21,930 (May 2, 2001). This interpretation was upheld in American Forest and
Paper Ass’n v. EPA, 294 F.3d 113 (D.C. Cir. 2002), as accurately reflecting the unambiguous language
of the statute.  See id. at 119.  Thus, the burden of proof has shifted.  To put it simplistically, a substance
listed by Congress is deemed guilty until proven harmless rather than innocent until proven harmful.
36. Sheldon Krimsky, The Precautionary Approach, 13 F. FOR APPLIED RES. & PUB. POL’Y 34, 34-
37 (Fall 1998).  But see J. Martin Wagner, The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the
United States, 6 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 459, 459-77 (2000) (pointing out that U.S.
rules for regulating chemicals are schizophrenic in this regard, putting a higher burden of proof on new
chemicals that may be safer than existing chemicals).
37. One could argue that there is an inexorable global move toward regulating the environment
and health in keeping with the Precautionary Principle, that the Precautionary Principle is no more
than another ratcheting up of the demand for health and for a clean environment occurring as part of
economic development.  Yet, there is also at least one example, dietary supplements, where the oppo-
site appears to have occurred.  Federal legislation, the 1994 Dietary Supplement Health and Education
Act, severely limits the FDA from regulating the safety and efficacy of supplements sold to the public.
See 21 U.S.C. § 342(f) (2000). There, the burden of proof was shifted away from the industry, which
formerly had to demonstrate safety, and onto the FDA, which must now prove harm, the reverse of
what happened to EPA with hazardous air pollutants.  Id.  It would be interesting to determine whether
those who support the precautionary shift in the burden of proof in relation to hazardous air pollutants
also support the retrogressive shift in the burden of proof in the case of dietary supplements.  Is what
we are observing a worldview related to nature and natural products rather than a belief in the Precau-
tionary Principle?
38. Emission standards must require the “maximum degree of reduction” in HAP emissions that
EPA determines is achievable (including a complete prohibition, where achievable), taking into con-
sideration cost and any non-air-quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements.  42
U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2).  The “maximum degree of reduction in emissions” deemed achievable for existing
sources may not be less stringent than the average emission limitation achieved by the best-performing
twelve percent of sources in the category or subcategory.  § 7412(d)(3).  For new sources, it may not be
less stringent than the emission control achieved in practice by the single best-controlled similar source.
Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d).  EPA is directed to establish emission standards for each subcategory and
subcategory of HAPs sources.  Id.  EPA may make distinctions based on class, type, and size of source
within a category or subcategory, but nothing in the statute permits the agency to make distinctions
based on such risk factors as how potentially dangerous the substance is or how many people live
nearby.  Id.  Also, MACT is not really the “maximum” available control technology.  Wisely, section
112 contains language in which “maximum” is defined as the upper twelve percent of existing control
technology, and there are other provisions that make it somewhat less daunting to define MACT. 42
U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)(A).
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how harmful the emitted chemical is known to be at ambient levels.  This
across-the-board, one-size-fits-all approach, without regard to the extent of
population exposure or risk, contrasts markedly with EPA’s risk and cost based
selection of sources to regulate in the 1984 benzene NESHAPs.40  In sum, the
1990 amendments ignore science and risk in determining which substances to
designate as HAPs, which industrial sources of those substances to regulate, and
how stringently to regulate them.  Moreover, they shift the burden of proof
from those advocating regulation to those opposing regulation, at least with
respect to the 189 HAPs listed by Congress.  They are therefore a regulatory
action falling squarely within the category of primary precautionary action.
The amended program does, however, retain elements that can be viewed as
risk-based precaution in its residual risk provisions, for example, the one-in-a-
million target for the residual risk determination or the choice of the MEI as a
target for the regulation of residual risk.41  Nevertheless, these elements are sec-
ondary to the true thrust of the amendments. They are provisions that only
serve to bolster the inclusiveness of the primary precautionary provisions.
IV
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1990 CAAA FOR UNDERSTANDING
THE IMPACT OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
The question arises, then, have these precautionary approaches worked?
The 1990 advocacy position was that the new approach would be faster, better,
and cheaper.  It is at least arguable that it has not been faster or cheaper, given
how long it has taken to write the regulations and their high cost of develop-
ment and administration, not to mention the toll that uncertainty has on the
marketplace.  EPA has missed each one of its statutory deadlines for providing
the regulations (although not by that much) and this has led to much grumbling
from states and industry.42  However, the key issue is whether this new approach
has been better in achieving the public-health goals that are both explicit and
implicit in the 1990 CAAA.
Achieving MACT inherently means that many tons of HAPs will be
removed from the air, but we do not know how much of a health difference this
will make, at least directly (it presumably has helped with ozone control).
Almost all of the HAPs for which there was at least presumptive evidence that
ambient levels provided a risk of adverse effects had been regulated before the
1990 CAAA, and those few for which there is new information, for example,
40. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions from
Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, and Benzene Storage Vessels; Proposed With-
drawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 8386 (proposed Mar. 6, 1984).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A).
42. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION AND ISSUES OF THE
CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/newitems/
rc0072.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2003).
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butadiene, could have been regulated under the pre-1990 approach.43  By requir-
ing MACT, these amendments have led to more stringent control of at least
some harmful pollutants, an impact that could be quantified (for example,
reduction of outdoor benzene levels and the corresponding decrease in expo-
sure and leukemia risk).  However, for almost all of these newly regulated pol-
lutants, which include the overwhelming majority of the 189 on the original list,
there is inadequate data on which to base any firm presumption of health or
environmental benefit.44
Of course, the reason there is so much uncertainty about health benefit is
implicit in the Precautionary Principle.  If you regulate pollutants without some
degree of proof they are harmful, how can you quantify what harm has been
averted?  The congressional requirement that EPA perform a cost-benefit
analysis, which can be done for NAAQS pollutants, cannot be achieved for
those HAPs for which there is no evidence of benefit.45  EPA is attempting to
deal with the cost-benefit issues of HAPs and is caught in the very difficult
situation of having to tell Congress that a legislative provision based on a pre-
cautionary approach that requires an agency to take actions without direct evi-
dence of adverse effect is not readily compatible with another provision of the
same law requiring cost-benefit analysis.46  But, EPA has avoided making this
statement, instead focusing on methodological issues and case studies of com-
pounds that were previously regulated.47
43. The developing toxicological and epidemiological information on butadiene led to two formal
reviews of this compound by the U.S. National Toxicology Program since 1990.  The outcomes were
that butadiene was listed first as a “reasonably anticipated human carcinogen,” the second highest haz-
ard classification, and then additionally listed as a “known human carcinogen,” the highest classifica-
tion.  See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 10TH REPORT ON CARCINOGENS: 1-3, BUTADIENE
(2002), available at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/roc/tenth/profiles/s025buta.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2003).
As all commonly emitted air toxics that are “known human carcinogens” had been regulated before
1990, it is fair to assume that butadiene would have been regulated under the old rules.
44. A demonstration of the relative lack of information for many of the chemicals on Congress’s
list can be obtained by considering how many of the 189 chemicals were chosen for additional study
under the new “high production volume” (HPV) agreement between EPA and the chemical industry.
See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 1990 HPV CHEMICAL LIST (1990), available at
http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/hpv_1990.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2003); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, 1994 HPV CHALLENGE PROGRAM CHEMICAL LIST (1994), available at
http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/hpv_1994.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2003); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, ORIGINAL LIST OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/orig189.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).  We count 108 of the 189 toxic air
pollutants to also be in the HPV list.
45. As discussed infra, evidence of benefit could be obtained if there is a willingness to invest in
research to determine if the precautionary decrease in pollutant levels has had a positive impact on
public health or the environment.  EPA apparently recognizes the problem, as it reportedly has asked
for FY 2004 budgetary funds to assess air toxics, among other programs, as the “agency has failed to
generate data demonstrating health or environmental improvements.”  See EPA Seeks Funds to
Launch Effort Showing Program Effectiveness, 10 RISK POL’Y REP. No. 2, at 17-18 (2003).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 7612 (2000).
47. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, WORKSHOP ON THE BENEFITS OF REDUCTIONS IN
EXPOSURE TO HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS: DEVELOPING BEST ESTIMATES OF DOSE-RESPONSE
FUNCTIONS, SAB Report No. EPA-SAB-EC-WKSHP-02-001 (2002).  This lack of being able to esti-
mate benefit is a common problem in primary prevention.  We often wave our hands and say that there
is a 16:1 cost-benefit ratio based on the notion that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
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V
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Using the Precautionary Principle as a weapon against pollutants holds
important implications for scientific research.  A central issue is the develop-
ment of benefit indicators that go beyond tons of pollutants.  Using pollutant
weight rather than pollutant effect as a marker for achievement can be prob-
lematic, particularly where there is a clear differential in the potential for toxic-
ity.  Removing a ton of toluene from air emissions is probably meaningless in
terms of public health, while removing a ton of benzene is probably of value.
The current approach under the Clean Air Act initially focuses the same atten-
tion on both, which necessitates the residual risk provision,48 the requirement of
additional action if pollution risk persists, to distinguish between them, if at all.49
Better indicators of the potential for adverse health effects are needed to
develop cost-effective approaches to reducing the presence of HAPs.  For
example, much of the outdoor pollutant exposures regulated by the Clean Air
Act are relatively trivial compared to indoor exposures.50
Nevertheless, actions under the Precautionary Principle are based more
upon information than on understanding—there must be sufficient information
to raise the possibility of harm, but not sufficient understanding to know
whether the harm will in fact occur.  As demonstrated by the HAPs situation, in
a precaution-driven world there should be a premium on developing and using
the appropriate metrics to effectively drive the precautionary action.  While the
driving force for the precautionary approach to regulating HAPs was informa-
tion about the tons of pollutants released, derived in large part from the Toxic
Release Inventory, it would be far better and far more precautionary if we were
able to act on information related to the likelihood that the emitted pollutant
would produce harm at the level to which the public is being exposed.  The jus-
tification for invoking the Precautionary Principle under almost any circum-
stance is that we cannot wait for the slow process of accumulating all of the sci-
entific evidence before acting to protect public health and the environment.51
But public health also requires efficient use of resources to achieve benefit, something that is difficult to
demonstrate in the present approach.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f).
49. We note that as of this writing it is thirteen years since the passage of the 1990 CAAA and the
residual risk regulations have yet to be rolled out, let alone tested in the courts.  A recent attempt by
EPA to include a low-risk exemption in its air toxics rules has been highly controversial and is yet unre-
solved.  See EPA Delays Inclusion of Low-risk Exemptions in Air Toxic Rules, 10 RISK POL’Y REP. No.
3, at 22-23 (2003).
50. Lance Wallace, Comparison of Risks from Outdoor and Indoor Exposure to Toxic Chemicals,
95 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 7, 7-13 (1991).
51. Invoking the Precautionary Principle requires at least two conditions to be met:
(1)  There is uncertainty about whether there is an effect—if there was certainty there would
be no need to invoke the Precautionary Principle;
(2)  There are substantial economic or social costs involved in the precautionary action—if the
action could be done cheaply there would be no need to argue about it.
010904 GOLDSTEIN.DOC 02/11/04  4:18 PM
258 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:247
Yet acting under the Precautionary Principle should not be an excuse to avoid
obtaining the necessary information. And because the Precautionary Principle
inevitably carries with it the possibility that a costly precautionary action will be
taken erroneously, it is a tautology that the more precautionary a society, the
more likely it is that its regulatory decisions have been erroneous and costly.52
Thus, the Precautionary Principle places a higher premium on research to
determine whether the precautionary action has been justified.
Accordingly, those invoking the Precautionary Principle should, at the least,
discuss a research program that would, after the precautionary action, let us
know whether the action was appropriate and beneficial.  However, research
after regulation would be unusual for a regulatory agency.  After the major
stress of promulgating new regulations, it is only human nature to avoid discov-
ering that one was wrong.  In addition, the limited research budget available to
regulatory agencies inevitably focuses their research on the next issue in the
pipeline.  Yet, given the magnitude and probability of error in employing the
Precautionary Principle in regulations, there ought to be a higher priority for
research to find out if the precautionary action is beneficial.53  Unfortunately,
since the 1990 CAAA, EPA has shown little interest in research on HAPs.54
This does not bode well for correcting the costly mistakes that, while justified at
the time, are built inevitably into actions taken under the Precautionary Princi-
ple.
VI
RESIDUAL RISK AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
The CAAA HAPs provisions also contain language concerning residual risk
that calls for additional action if a prescribed level of risk persisted after instal-
Bernard D. Goldstein, The Precautionary Principle and Scientific Research Are Not Antithetical, 107
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 594, 594-95 (1999).
52. The costs of unnecessary regulation of HAPs can be expressed in dollars.  For certain other
precautionary actions—for example, regulating endocrine disruptors to protect amphibians—if there is
another cause that is responsible, it is likely to be missed because of the misplaced focus on the errone-
ous precautionary action.
53. Performing the study at the time of regulation has the added benefit of providing a greater
likelihood of determining a cause-and-effect relationship.  About the only time that real-world studies
of humans or the environment can approach the tight control measures of a laboratory study is when
we can anticipate a change in exposure.  Studying the impact of the change in the level of a pollutant
that results from a regulatory action is about the best we can do.
54. For example, EPA’s STAR program has shown little interest in toxic air pollutants.  The STAR
program is an approximately $100 million-per-year extramural research program that sends out a list of
specific topics of interest to EPA to the nation’s research community. See NAT’L CENTER FOR ENVTL.
RESEARCH, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, STAR GRANTS AND COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS,
at http://es.epa.gov/ncer/grants (last visited Mar. 23, 2003).  Of the 136 topics for which grants were
awarded from 1995, the year the program began, until 2002, only the two years of funding in Urban Air
Toxics (1998-1999) qualifies as a HAP research  topic—and this topic is really concerned with environ-
mental justice issues.  In addition, in 1995, one of the six grants in the general air pollution category
dealt with the health effects of a hazardous air pollutant.  Id.  The recent announcement of research
opportunities for 2003 lists twenty-one topics, again none that are directly related to HAPs.  Id. at
http://es.epa.gov/ncer/rfa/#star (last visited Mar. 23, 2003).
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lation of MACT.  There are two measures of risk for this requirement that
could be considered to be risk-based precautionary actions.  The first is the risk
management decision to set the target at a risk of one in one million.  This test
is far more stringent than has been used in past NESHAP rules and, particularly
for certain compounds like benzene, will be difficult to achieve.55  The amend-
ment specifies that the guiding risk be that of the maximally exposed individual
(“MEI”) rather than the population.56  The problem with using the MEI rather
than the entire exposed population is that its focus on the individual is the
antithesis of public-health laws for which the concern should be the popula-
tion.57  Furthermore, it is much more likely to be erroneous than population-
based approaches and is not well-tailored to achieve precautionary goals.
VII
LOSS OF PUBLIC-HEALTH FOCUS
From a public-health point of view, the major criticisms of the Clean Air
Act go well beyond its misplaced emphasis on the MEI as a target for residual
risk determinations.  The precautionary approach embodied in the 1990 CAAA
intended to decrease exposure to air pollutants that could conceivably cause
harm on one level is consistent with public-health principles but on another
level is contradictory.  The basic principles of public-health practice include a
respect for efficient approaches to decrease the potential for harm.  In envi-
ronmental health, this occurs primarily through reducing emissions, interdicting
55. The current EPA cancer risk potency figure for benzene is that a one-in-a-million leukemia risk
occurs with exposure to 0.13 to 0.45 ug/m3 for seventy years.  See U.S. EPA Integrated Risk Informa-
tion System, Benzene: Reference Concentration for Chronic Inhalation Exposure, at
http://www.epa.gov/iris/ subst/0276.htm#refinhal (last visited Apr. 11, 2003).  Compare this to outdoor
urban levels in Los Angeles in 1987 of 7.1 ug/m3 in February and 3.7 ug/m3 in July.  See Lance Wallace
et al., The Los Angeles Team Study: Personal Exposures, Indoor-Outdoor Air Concentrations, and
Breath Concentrations of 25 Volatile Organic Compounds, 1 J. EXPOSURE ANALYSIS & ENVTL.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 157, 157-92 (1991).
56. Just as with maximum control technology, “maximum” does not really mean maximum, but
rather has been defined operationally by EPA to be toward the upper end of the expected exposure
distribution.  See supra note 39.
57. Bernard D. Goldstein, The Maximally Exposed Individual: An Inappropriate Basis for Public
Health Decision-Making, 6 ENVTL. F. 13, 13-16 (1989).  Consider two examples.  A plant at the edge of
the Hudson River in northern New Jersey has no one living downwind for at least a mile, leading the
MEI across the river in Manhattan to be exposed to only a 5–in–10-million lifetime risk of cancer.  But
there will be only a gradual drop off in risk beyond that one mile so that the average risk to perhaps 10
million people in the New York area could be 1–in–10-million lifetime risk; we would anticipate one
cancer case every seventy years from that exposure.  Now consider a plant at the edge of the Mojave
Desert for which there is one family of four living immediately downwind subjected to a 1–in–1-million
lifetime risk, and assume that there is no one else for a hundred miles.  Standard risk assessment
assumptions require that family of four to live there seventy years before being replaced by another
family of four, ad infinitum.  In that case, there would be one cancer case every 17.5 million years, a
time about ten-fold longer than humans have been on this planet.  But the MEI approach would force
us to regulate the latter, not the former.
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exposure pathways, or substituting harmful products for ones that are less
harmful.58
Effective interdiction of exposure pathways logically should start with an
understanding of the sources and pathways resulting in the greatest likelihood
for exposure.  In the case of HAPs, for the general public the likelihood of
exposure is overwhelmingly indoors for well-studied HAP compounds that are
known to be harmful, such as benzene.59  If the goal of the law is to decrease
exposure to HAPs, it has taken an approach that will have little impact as com-
pared to focusing the same level of resources on indoor sources of the same
compounds.
Another public-health deficiency in the precautionary approach of the 1990
CAAA is the treatment of all chemicals on the list as if they presented the same
hazard at expected ambient concentrations.  For the purposes of MACT, it does
not matter whether the chemical is benzene or toluene (methyl benzene, the
simplest alkyl benzene).  And while there is no question that benzene is a cause
of human leukemia, toluene, though chemically closely related to benzene, does
not cause the bone marrow damage and leukemia observed with benzene, and
has no demonstrated human toxicity except at concentrations at least a thou-
sand-fold greater than that observed in ambient air.60  The same holds true for
other related alkyl benzenes also present in petroleum and used extensively in
industry.  In fact, one major effort to decrease workers’ and the public’s expo-
sure to benzene has been encouraging substitution for benzene of well-studied
alkyl benzenes that are far less risky, particularly at low concentrations.  How-
ever, a consequence of the MACT approach to a list of 189 compounds of
markedly different potentials for toxicity is that all compounds are treated the
same in terms of required controls.
The driver in the 1990 CAAA for an industry to adopt the standard envi-
ronmental health approach of substituting lesser toxic compounds comes from
its residual risk provisions.61  Though there is another item within the 1990
CAAA HAPs provisions leading to chemical substitution, the HAP amend-
ments push industry to find relatively unstudied compounds that are not on the
EPA list.  This is not necessarily a public benefit, as there is the potential for
unexpected risk in using relatively unstudied chemical compounds.  It is hoped
that the requirement that EPA add these newly used compounds to the HAP
58. A discussion of the Precautionary Principle in terms of being more “upstream” than pollution
prevention or pollution control can be found in Brian Mayer et al., Moving Further Upstream: From
Toxics Reduction to the Precautionary Principle, 117 PUB. HEALTH REP. 574, 574-612 (2002).
59. See Wallace, supra note 50, at 7-13.
60. Benzene is the only known carcinogen among all of the alkyl benzenes.  It is thus treated as if
every molecule had some finite risk of causing cancer, while, in contrast, the alkyl benzenes are consid-
ered to have a threshold below which they are assumed to be harmless.  See Goldstein, Benzene
Hematotoxicity, supra note 21, at 69.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A).
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list62 will counteract the benefit industry receives by choosing those relatively
unstudied compounds not already on the list.
VIII
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE PRIMARY PRECAUTIONARY ASPECTS
OF THE 1990 CAAA HAP PROVISIONS
Despite the troublesome effects of legislating by the Precautionary Princi-
ple, there has been virtually no judicial review of the primary precautionary
aspects of the HAPs amendments.63  This is perhaps not surprising.  It is difficult
to conceive of any grounds for constitutional challenge to those provisions.
While we have expressed some concerns about the effectiveness of those provi-
sions to accomplish Congress’s goal of reducing adverse health or
environmental effects of air pollution, mere ineffectiveness does not render
legislation vulnerable to judicial review.64
We found only four judicial opinions in the universe of reported judicial
decisions that contain the term “Precautionary Principle” in the context of envi-
ronmental and public-health regulation.65 Of those, none dealt with HAPs.
Nevertheless, we believe that the number of judicial opinions addressing the
Precautionary Principle will rise dramatically as the concept becomes more fre-
quently employed in legislation and as it becomes familiar to tort and environ-
mental litigators.  Distinguishing between pre-emptive precautionary and risk-
based approaches may be helpful in sorting out the implications of actions
embracing the uncertainty for which the Precautionary Principle stands.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2), (b)(3)(B).  Section (b)(2) requires the EPA administrator to peri-
odically review and, where appropriate, revise the list, adding pollutants that present, or may present, a
threat of adverse human health or environmental effects.  Section (b)(3)(B) requires that when peti-
tions to modify the list are made, the administrator shall add a substance upon a showing by the peti-
tioner or on the administrator’s own determination that emissions are known to cause or may reasona-
bly be anticipated to cause adverse effects.
63. But see Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n v. EPA, 294 F.3d 113, 122 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  In American
Forest and Paper, the industry plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged EPA’s denial of a petition to de-list
methanol as a HAP.  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that EPA was improperly relying on
mere speculation about adverse effects.  Id. at 119-22.  The court made it clear that the burden of
proof—and therefore the burden of scientific uncertainty—rests on the petitioner.  Id. at 119.
64. In the words of the Supreme Court:
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course selected by the
Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute.  Once the meaning of an
enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an
end.  We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto.
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978).
65. Westlaw search term, “Precautionary Principle,” All State & Federal Cases Database (Feb.
2003); Lexis search term, “Precautionary Principle,” Federal & State Cases Directory (Feb. 2003).
